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The Effects of Invalidating a Law
on the Grounds of Equal
Protection
By RICHARD MARSHALL ABRAMS*

Introduction
When a court invalidates a law on equal protection grounds,1
the 'process of judicial interpretation may have only just begun.
The court must then fashion the appropriate remedy.
A violation of the equal protection clause presents the reviewing court with a peculiar remedial problem. When a substantive
law offends equal protection principles, the law draws a constitutionally impermissible distinction between similarly situated persons. 2 A law may dispense its benefits or burdens unequally among
similarly situated persons by bringing one class of persons under
the legislative umbrella while excluding another. Should the operation of the invalidated law be extended or curtailed altogether? A
court could achieve equal treatment under the law by bringing the
formerly excluded group of similarly situated persons within the
legislative net. Alternatively, the court could curtail the operation
of the law altogether, uniformly negativing the effect of a law with
respect to all persons. As a related problem, the court must also
determine whether its ruling is to be given retroactive effect. These
two problems, curtailment or extension and retroactivity, exist
whether the invalidated law is a statute, an administrative regula* B.S.B.A., 1969, Bucknell University;, J.D., 1972, Harvard University;, Practicing Attorney, Pennsylvania Bar.
1. The equal protection clause of the United States Constitution provides: "No state
shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. Tussman & tenBroek, Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALiI. L. REv. 341, 344
(1949).
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tion, or a judicial ruling.
This article examines the factors influencing a court's choice
between each of these remedial alternatives and proposes a framework for their simultaneous analysis.

I. Extension or Curtailment?
Reviewing courts rarely discuss the problem of extension or
curtailment. Usually the disadvantaged or excluded class of persons who challenge the law on equal protection grounds will seek a
specific remedy, either extending the law's benefits to or curtailing
its adverse impact on themselves. The challenging party will ensure that the court takes cognizance of the remedy it desires. But
the propriety of affording that particular remedy is a different
question. 3
Mr. Justice Harlan discussed the extension remedy in his concurring opinion in Welsh v. United States.4 The petitioner in
Welsh was denied conscientious objector status and was convicted
of refusing to submit to induction into the Armed Forces. Welsh
was deemed ineligible for conscientious objector status because his
pacifist convictions were based on ethical and moral, rather than
religious, beliefs. A majority of the Court reversed Welsh's conviction on principles of statutory construction, but Mr. Justice Harlan
separately reached the constitutional question in his concurrence.
He found the statute, on its face, violative of equal protection principles, and then discussed the constitutional remedy.
Justice Harlan acknowledged that two remedial alternatives
were possible, total nullification of the statute or inclusion of the
petitioner. 5 For guidance on the choice between alternatives, he
looked to the broad severability clause of the statute. The existence of a severability provision "'disclose[d] an intention to make
the Act divisible and create[d] a presumption that, eliminating invalid parts, the legislature would have been satisfied with what re3. See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 90 (1979) ("All parties before the District Court agreed that extension was the appropriate remedy.").
4. 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).

5. "Where a statute is defective because of under-inclusion there exist two remedial
alternatives: a court may either declare it a nullity and order that its benefits not extend to
the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute to include those who are aggrieved by exclusion." Id. at 361.

Fall 1980]

mained ...

EQUAL PROTECTION

.' "6 In

exercising discretion conferred by a severability

clause, courts must also weigh the "intensity of commitment to the
residual policy" and the relative "potential disruption of the statutory scheme" resulting from extension or abrogation.7 Justice
Harlan thus articulated three guiding considerations for choosing
between the extension or curtailment: the legislative intent as to
the severability, the policy and purpose of the statute, and the potential disruption of the statutory scheme.8
Harlan concluded that the benefits of conscientious objector
status should be extended to Welsh rather than denied to everyone
else, given that "[tihe policy of exempting religious conscientious
objectors is one of longstanding tradition in this country and accords recognition to what is, in a diverse and 'open' society, the
important value of reconciling individuality of belief with practical
exigencies whenever possible."9 A policy of such longstanding historical and cultural significance constituted "a compelling reason
for a court to hazard the necessary statutory repairs .

.

. even

though they entail, not simply eliminating an offending section,
but rather building upon it. ''1°

The Supreme Court again tackled the problem of remedial alternatives in Califano v. Westcott.1" In Westcott, the Court struck
down section 607 of the Social Security Act1 2 which provided benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program to families whose dependent children were deprived of
parental support because of the unemployment of the father, but
not of the mother.13
Addressing the choice of extension or invalidation, the Court
noted that extension rather than nullification was the proper remedy in cases involving underinclusive federal benefits statutes. 4
6.

Id. at 364 (quoting Champlin Rfg. Co. v. Commission, 286 U.S. 210, 235 (1932)).

7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 365.
Id.
Id. at 365-66.
Id. at 366 (footnote omitted).

11. 443 U.S. 76, 89-93 (1979).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1980).
13. 443 U.S. at 89. Cf. Part III infra. Although Westcott was decided under the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment instead of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the analysis was the same as in other sex discrimination cases. See, e.g.,
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
14. 443 U.S. at 89.
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The Court then affirmed the district court's extension of the benefits to families in which either the mother or the father is
unemployed.

15

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals confronted the extension
or curtailment dilemma in Moritz v. Commissioner.6 Moritz held
that former section 214 of the Internal Revenue Code, 17 which allowed an income tax deduction only to women, widowers, divorcees
and married men, unconstitutionally discriminated against single
men. The court extended the deduction to single men, rather than
denying it to everyone else, due primarily to the ameliorative purpose of the deduction provision and the broad severability clause
of the Code."'
Thus the Tenth Circuit based its choice of remedy in Moritz
on the same three guiding factors articulated in Welsh v. United
States: (1) the existence of a severability clause, (2) the purpose of
the statute, 9 and (3) the degree of disruption of the statutory
scheme resulting from invalidation, as opposed to extension, of the
section.20
II. Retroactivity
In addition to choosing between extension or curtailment, a
court must also determine the impact of its declaration of unconstitutionality in three distinct contexts: (1) in deciding other cases
involving similar discrimination occurring after the date of that
15. Id. at 93.
16. 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906 (1973).
17. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 68A, Stat. 70 (repealed 1976).
18. 469 F.2d at 470.
19. Id.
20. Id. Accord, "Americans United" Inc. v. Walters, 477 F.2d 1169, 1173 n.5 (D.C. Cir.
1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752
(1974). Cf. New Jersey Chapter, Am. Inst. of Planners v. New Jersey State Bd. of Professional Planners, 48 N.J. 581, 227 A.2d 313 (1967). Criminal statutes found defective on equal
protection grounds may require different treatment. For example, in Tatro v. State, 372 So.
2d 283 (Miss. 1979), the Mississippi "Fondling Statute" was held to be unconstitutionally
sexually discriminatory because it applied only to "male persons." Since the Mississippi
Supreme Court could not create a crime by construction, the statute could not be extended
to "female persons"; therefore the entire statute was void. Id. at 285. But cf. Plas v. State,
598 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1979), in which a prostitution statute prohibiting certain conduct "by
a female" was invalidated on equal protection grounds. The court severed the restrictive
gender-based provision from the statute, effectively bringing both sexes within its reach. Id.
at 968-69.
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declaration (prospective application), (2) in deciding other cases
involving similar discrimination occurring before the date of that
declaration (retrospective application), and (3) in shaping a remedy in the case at bar-the case that gave rise to the declaration of
21
unconstitutionality.
Judicial invalidation of a discriminatory law necessarily operates prospectively with respect to both the parties at bar and other
potential victims of the discriminatory law.2 2 But the typical judicial dilemma concerns retroactive application of the court's new
rule to the parties at bar and to other victims of discrimination
predating the court's ruling. Accordingly, contexts (2) and (3)
above will be considered in order.
A.

Retrospective Application to Prior Discrimination in
Other Cases

In the past, the Supreme Court has given judicial invalidation
23
of a law complete retroactive effect. In Norton v. Shelby County,
the Court held that the acts of county commissioners in issuing
bonds were of no force and effect since the State Act vesting the
board with authority was unconstitutional. The Court adopted
Blackstone's view that since "[a]n unconstitutional act is not a law;
it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never
passed.
The Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas recently applied
21. It is important to remember that we are discussing equal protection violations of
substantive law, not procedural law. Therefore the three contexts for applying the new rule

are based upon the time of the act which gave rise to the litigation, not the time of the
litigation itself. In considering equal protection violations of procedural law, on the other
hand, the contexts for applying the new rule are based on when the litigation occurred.
Accordingly, in both civil and criminal litigation, there are actually four possibilities: (1)
prospective application only, (2) retrospective application only to the parties at bar, (3) retrospective application to the parties at bar and to other pending litigation, and (4) retrospective application to the parties at bar, to pending litigation, and to litigation terminated
by final judgment (complete retroactivity). State v. Nash, 64 N.J. 464, 469-70, 317 A.2d 689,
691-92 (1974).
22. See generally Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. Rav. 201 (1965); Levy, Realist Jurisprudenceand Prospective Overruling,
109 U. PA. L. RPv.1 (1960); Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in

the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962).
23.

118 U.S. 425 (1886).

24. Id. at 442. See generally Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-25 (1965).
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this principle of absolute retroactive invalidity to strike down certain Pennsylvania divorce statutes as violative of the Equal Rights
Amendment to the state constitution.2 5 The court likened its role
to that of a "jeweler [who] . . . state[s], after examining what is
supposed to be a diamond, that it is in reality glass. He does not
''26
make it glass; he merely finds out that it is.
The Second Circuit applied the principle of absolute retroactivity in United States ex rel. Williams v. Preiser.27 In that case,
the court reversed the manslaughter conviction of a doctor under
an abortion statute subsequently invalidated on constitutional
grounds by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade.28 The Second Circuit applied Roe retroactively,2 9 relying on Norton v. Shelby
County.30
Reviewing courts have not, however, universally applied the
rule of absolute retroactive invalidity. For example, in Chicot
County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 1 the Court held
that bondholders of a state drainage district were estopped by
principles of res judicata from raising the issue of constitutionality
of a federal statute in a subsequent action, even though in the interim the Supreme Court had declared the statute unconstitutional. While basing its decision on principles of res judicata, the
Court remarked that:
[S]uch broad statements [in Norton v. Shelby County] as to the
effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken
with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always
be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects-with respect to particular relations, individual and cor25. Frank v. Frank, 15 Pa. Lebanon County 61, 65 (1974). The Pennsylvania Constitution provides: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual." PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28
(Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated erroneously cites the Equal Rights Amendment
as PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27). See also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 627 (1965); Chicot
County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940).
26. Frank v. Frank, 15 Pa. Lebanon County 61, 65 (1974).
27. 497 F.2d 337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1058 (1974).
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
29. 497 F.2d at 339.
30. 118 U.S. 425 (1886).
31. 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
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porate, and particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of
public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of
its previous application, demand examination. These questions
are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the at-

tention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of
a principle of
32
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
In Linkletter v. Walker,33 the Supreme Court adopted this
principle of "limited retroactive" invalidity,34 relying on the dicta
of Chicot County. Linkletter involved the retroactive effect of the
Supreme Court's own exclusionary rule-a judicially created rule
used in criminal cases to exclude evidence obtained through unconstitutional searches. 5 Although Linkletter dealt with retroactivity in the context of criminal law, the Court suggested that retroactivity applies to judicial changes in all law-whether statutory,
constitutional, or judicial, in both civil and criminal litigation."
Under Linkletter, retroactive treatment will depend on the degree
of possible prejudice to those who have relied on the invalidated
rule,3 7 "the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and
effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard
its operation."3 "
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that "[tihere are no
hard and fast rules

. . .

in the retroactivity area.

.

." by saying,

"[R]etroactivity is essentially a pragmatic, case-by-case, result-oriented process whereby the often competing interests of society, the
accused . . . and the efficient administration of justice are bal-

anced and weighed."39
The Supreme Court has, however, developed a three-pronged
test to analyze whether or not a new judicial ruling of invalidity or
32. Id. at 374 (footnote omitted).
33.

381 U.S. 618 (1965).

34. Id. at 625. See also MPI, Inc. v. McCullough, 463 F. Supp. 887, 901 (N.D. Miss.
1978); 15 Pa. Lebanon County 61, 65 (1974).
35.
36.

See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
381 U.S. at 625-27. Accord, Mitchell, 606 F.2d 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1979); State v. Nash,

64 N.J. 464, 470, 317 A.2d 689, 691 (1974); Planned Parenthood v. State, 138 N.J. Super.
450, 455, 351 A.2d 382, 384 (1976).
37.
38.
39.

381 U.S. at 627.
Id. at 629.
Vaccaro v. United States, 461 F.2d 626, 629 (5th Cir. 1972).
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unconstitutionality should be applied retroactively. The courts will
examine: (1) the purpose of the new ruling or of the constitutional
principles at issue, (2) the reasonableness and extent of reliance on
the overturned law, and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new ruling.4 0
The doctrine of absolute retroactive invalidity will generally
control; limited retroactive invalidity is the exception.4 1 Accordingly, absolute retroactivity is applied in the absence of counter42
vailing considerations as set forth in the three-pronged test.
B.

Retrospective Application to the Parties at Bar

Even in cases which are not given general retroactive application, the new rule is usually applied to the parties at bar,43 so that
"'constitutional adjiudications [may] not stand as mere dictum.'",
But the choice between retroactive or purely prospective application persists with respect to the parties at bar as well.
The Constitution does not forbid purely prospective judicial
decisions. 45 The United States Supreme Court itself has fashioned
such prospective remedies." In England v. Louisiana State Board
of Medical Examiners,47 the petitioners, chiropractors, sought to
practice in Louisiana without complying with the educational requirements of the Louisiana Medical Practice Act.48 They chal40. Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 679-82 (1973); Radcliff v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 1093,
1095 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 939 (1975); Vaccaro v. United States, 461 F.2d
626, 631 n.29 (5th Cir. 1972); State v. Nash, 64 N.J. 464, 471, 317 A.2d 689, 692 (1974);
Planned Parenthood v. State, 138 N.J. Super. 450, 455, 351 A.2d 382, 384 (1976). Cf. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 606 F.2d 1172 (D.C.
Cir. 1979); Retail Clerks Local 1357 v. Leonard, 450 F. Supp. 663, 666-67 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
41. Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507-08 (1973); United States ex rel. Williams v.
Preiser, 497 F.2d 337, 339 n.4 (2d Cir. 1974).
42. United States v. Fitzgerald, 545 F.2d 578, 581-82 (7th Cir. 1976); Frank v. Frank,
15 Pa. Lebanon County 61, 65 (1974). Cf., Retail Clerks Local 1357 v. Leonard, 450 F. Supp.
663, 666-67 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
43. See generally Currier, supra note 22; Levy, supra note 22; Note, supra note 22.
44. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 255 n.24 (1969) (quoting Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967)).
45. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733 (1966); Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil
& Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 363-66 (1932); Currier, supra note 22, at 211, 216-34; Levy,
supra note 22, at 13-16.
46. See, e.g., England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411
(1964); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961); Currier, supra note 22, at 233-34. See
also Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863).
47. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
48. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 1261-1290 (West 1964).
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lenged the statute in federal district court on the ground that the
act as applied to them violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 49 A

three-judge court invoked the doctrine of abstention sua sponte
and remanded the parties to state court." The chiropractors renewed both their Fourteenth Amendment and state law claims in
state court and lost on the constitutional questions.5 1 Undaunted,

the chiropracters then returned to federal court. The district court
dismissed their complaint on the ground that they had foregone
their right to return to federal court by submitting their constitutional claims to the state court.2 On review, the Supreme Court
held that a party need not litigate his federal claims in state court
in order to preserve his right to return to federal court; he need
only inform the state court of the federal claims so that the court53
can construe the state statute "in light of" the federal claims.
The Court, however, declined to apply the rule to the parties at
bar, refusing to penalize them for their reasonable, albeit mistaken,
reliance on Government and Civic Employees OrganizingCommittee, CIO v. Windsor," a case which seemed to require that federal
claims be litigated in the state court.55
Similarly, in James v. United States,56 the Court did not apply its new rule to the party at bar, this time basing its decision on
the concept of willfulness. The Court in James overruled Commissioner v. Wilcox 57 and held that embezzled money constitutes tax-

able income. Petitioner James had been convicted of willfully
evading income tax by failing to include embezzled funds in his
gross income. The Court held that willfulness could not be proven
so long as the statute contained the gloss upon it by Wilcox. Accordingly, the conviction was not allowed to stand,5 8 despite the
fact that the Court overruled Wilcox.
Similarly, in State v. Jones,59 the New Mexico Supreme Court
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
1979).
59.

180 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. La. 1960).
Id. at 124.
126 So. 2d 51 (La. 1960).
194 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. La. 1961).
375 U.S. at 420.
353 U.S. 364 (1957).
See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. at 422-23.
366 U.S. 213 (1961).
327 U.S. 404 (1946).
366 U.S. at 221-22. Accord, Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463, 477-84 (E.D. Pa.
44 N.M. 623, 107 P.2d 324 (1940) (overruling City of Roswell v. Jones, 41 N.M.
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allowed one of its rulings only prospective effect. In 1937, the court
had held that a "Bank Night," sponsored by the defendant movie
theater, was not a lottery, and that therefore the operators of the
theater were not guilty of violating an ordinance forbidding the
conducting of lotteries." But, only three years later, the court
overruled its decision in a case involving the same ordinance, the
same defendants, and the same issue. 1 The court applied its ruling
prospectively because of the reliance factor.2
In the England, James and Jones cases, reliance on the newly
discredited law warranted purely prospective operation of the decisions.6 But these cases did not involve equal protection challenges.
What factors would operate in equal protection cases to exempt
the parties at bar from the ruling?
Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon 11)64 may offer some clues. In
Lemon I,65 the Supreme Court had invalidated a Pennsylvania
statute which gave public aid to non-public religious schools on the
grounds that the statute violated the establishment clause of the
First Amendment." Yet in Lemon II the Court permitted the state
to reimburse non-public schools for services provided prior to the
holding in Lemon L In limiting the retroactivity of its holding in
Lemon I, the Court in Lemon II acknowledged that it was really
determining the proper scope of an equitable decree in the same
case rather than determining its retroactive application to other
cases. The Court characterized the relationship between Lemon I
and Lemon II as a problem of equitable remedies rather than as a
retroactivity problem. Nonetheless, the Court considered the same
factors enunciated in other decisions involving retroactive application to like cases.6 7 Lemon II suggests that the same three-pronged
258, 67 P.2d 286 (1937)).
60. City of Roswell v. Jones, 41 N.M. 258, 67 P.2d 286 (1937).
61. State v. Jones, 44 N.M. 623, 107 P.2d 324 (1940).
62. Id. at 630-31, 107 P.2d at 329.
63. Currier, supra note 22, at 234-35; Levy, supra note 22, at 8-9, 24-26.
64. 411 U.S. 192 (1973).
65. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
66. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The establishment clause provides: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion .... .
67. 411 U.S. at 197-201; Thompson v. Washington, 551 F.2d 1316, 1321 n.6 (D.C. Cir.
1977). See also Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 767 n.23 (1976). For
another case characterizing retroactivity in terms of remedies, see Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 495-502 (1968) (full retroactivity in determining the amount of damages in an antitrust case).
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test, used to determine when retroactive application to the parties
at bar is appropriate, will determine when retroactive application
to other cases involving prior discrimination is appropriate. In
both contexts, a reviewing court must examine: (1) the purpose of
the new rule, (2) the degree of reliance on the old rule, and (3) the
rule's effect on the administration of justice or on the public at
large. 8 There will be a presumption in favor of full retroactivity.6 9
Although Lemon I and Lemon II involved a violation of the
establishment clause of the First Amendment"0 rather than the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,71 Justice
Harlan observed in Welsh v. United States72 that certain kinds of
religious discrimination require an "equal protection" mode of
analysis.7 3 Religious discrimination not only violates the disadvantaged class' right to equal protection and free exercise of religion,
but also prefers the advantaged class in violation of the establishment clause, while another class may suffer infringement of its free
exercise and equal protection rights.7 ' Given the interconnection
between the freedom of religion and equal protection analyses,
Lemon I and Lemon II suggest that the Supreme Court would apply the same three-pronged test to an equal protection case if
squarely faced with the issue.
Indeed, the Supreme Court may have implicitly adopted this
approach in City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
v. Manhart.5 The plaintiffs in Manhart sought relief under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196476 rather than under the equal
protection clause. They challenged the Water Department's requirement that female employees make larger contributions to its
pension fund than male employees. The Court held that the re68. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
69. See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
70. See note 66 supra.
.71. See note 1 supra.
72. 398 U.S. 333, 357 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 356-58.
74. See generally Abrams, Primary and Secondary Characteristicsin Discrimination
Cases, 23 VmL. L. REv. 35, 63-64 (1977).
75. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1980). Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII provides: "It

shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.. . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 8:29

quirement violated Title VII because it discriminated on the basis
of sex, but disallowed any retroactive monetary recovery. As in
Lemon II, the Court was determining the proper scope of an equitable remedy in the same case, rather than determining whether
its holding should be applied retroactively in other cases.7 Without citing Lemon II, the Court used the same three-pronged test:
the purpose of the new rule, reliance on the old rule, and the effect
78
of retroactivity on the public generally.
Under the first prong of the test, the purpose of the new rule
was to give men and women an equal stake in the pension fund by
requiring equal contributions, 79 and since this purpose would be
defeated by bankrupting the fund by assessing a large retroactive
damage award, the Court determined that "the rules that apply to
these funds should not be applied retroactively unless the legislature has plainly commanded that result." 80 Under the second
prong of the test, there had been substantial reliance on the former
rules, and this reliance was reasonable in light of conflicting authorities on the subject. 81 Under the third prong of the test, retroactivity could have widespread effects on the economy and on the
public at large. As the Court noted:
Retroactive liability could be devastating for a pension fund. The
harm would fall in large part on innocent third parties. If, as the
courts below apparently contemplated, the plaintiffs' contributions are recovered from the pension fund, the administrators of
the fund will be forced 'to meet unchanged obligations with diminished assets. If the reserve proves inadequate, either the expectations of all retired employees will be disappointed or current
employees will be forced to pay not only for their own future security but also for the unanticipated reduction in the contribu77.

435 U.S. at 717-23.

78. Id.
79. Id. at 717. Equal contributions from men and women may not necessarily result in
equal benefits for men and women, since women have a longer life expectincy than men. Id.;
EEOC v. Colby College, 439 F. Supp. 631 (D. Maine 1977), remanded for reconsideration in
light of Manhart, 589 F.2d 1139 (1st Cir. 1978) (pension fund requiring employees to contribute equally but paying different benefits to male and female employees may not violate
Title VII). But see Reilly v. Robertson, 266 Ind. 29, 34-35, 360 N.E.2d 171, 177-79 (1977)
(separate actuarial tables for male and female retired teachers for computation of benefits
paid violates equal protection clause).
80. Id. at 721 (footnote, indicating that Congress did not intend that result, omitted).
81. 435 U.S. at 720-22 and footnotes therein. But see authorities cited in note 79
supra. The ManhartCourt called its own decision "a marked departure from past practice."
435 U.S. at 722.
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82
tions of past employees.

These considerations overcame the presumption in favor of full
retroactivity,83 and the Court found retroactive monetary recovery
to be inappropriate."
Taken together, Lemon I, Lemon II and Manhart suggest that
the same criteria govern retroactivity of application, whether in
shaping a remedy in the case at bar or in deciding other cases involving prior, similar denials of equal protection. 5 The criteria are:
(1) the purpose of the new rule, (2) reliance on the newly discredited rule, and (3) effects on the public at large. The equities thus
considered must be sufficiently weighty to dispell the presumption
in favor of full retroactivity.86
III. Interconnection Between the Problem of
Extension or Curtailment and the Problem of
Retroactivity-A Proposal
When a court is called upon to determine the effects of an
equal protection violation, it may face two separate but related
problems. 87 The first is whether to cure the constitutional defect
by extending the law to the excluded class or by nullifying the law
altogether.8 8 The second is whether the court's decision should be
applied retrospectively or only prospectively. 89
The court resolves the first problem by fashioning a new law
which either extends or curtails the old law. The court decides
whether to extend or curtail based on three factors: (1) the severability provisions of the old law, (2) the purpose of the old law to
be extended or curtailed, and (3) the relative potential for disruption of the statutory scheme by extension or by curtailment. 90
The retroactivity question is necessarily interrelated with at
82. Id. at 722-23 (footnotes omitted).
83. Id. at 719; Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421-23 (1975). See text
accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
84. 435 U.S. at 721-23. Accord, Peters v. Wayne State Univ., 476 F. Supp. 1343 (E.D.
Mich. 1979).

85.

See text accompanying notes 64-84 supra.

86.
87.

See text accompanying notes 40-42 & 67-69 supra.
See Introduction supra.

88.

Part I supra.

89.

Part H supra.

90.

Part I supra.
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least two of these factors. The degree of disruption of the statutory
scheme and the new law's effects on the legislative purpose behind
the former law will both depend on whether and to what degree
the new law is applied retroactively.
This interrelation operates in the opposite direction as well. In
deciding whether to apply the new law retroactively, courts will examine: (1) the purpose of the new law, (2) the reliance on the old
law, and (3) the effect of retroactivity on the administration of justice or on the public at large.91 But the application of this threefactor test will vary depending on the new law-expanded or curtailed-to which it is applied. Therefore, a court's remedial
choices-between extension or curtailment and between retroactive or prospective application-are interdependent questions;
neither can be answered without some resolution, either implicit or
explicit, of the other. No cases have squarely faced the interconnection between these remedial choices. Those cases that consider
one problem, presuppose the answer to the other, which will often
have a clear solution in some overriding consideration. For example, a severability clause may determine the choice of extension or
curtailment;9 2 the presumption of complete retroactivity may dispose of the other problem. It is only where there are no such
overriding considerations that the cases require that the interrelationship between these two problems be examined.
Under such circumstances, a court might best analyze the remedial alternatives together. Initially, the court could formulate
six alternate remedies consisting of all possible combinations of the
remedial choices, as shown below.
Retrospective
Application

Complete Retrospective Appli-

Only

Only To The
Parties At Bar

cation

Extension
of the Law

Remedy 1

Remedy 2

Remedy 3

Curtailment
of the Law

Remedy 4

Remedy 5

Remedy 6

Prospective
Application

91.
92.
440 U.S.
93.

See text accompanying notes 40-42, 67-69 & 85-86 supra.
Stevens v. Califano, 448 F. Supp. 1313, 1323 (N.D. Ohio 1978), aff'd per curiam,
901 (1979).
See text accompanying notes 41-42, 69 & 86 supra.
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Then the court could consider the relevant criteria for resolving
the extension or curtailment question and the retroactivity question. The court would examine: (1) the purpose of the old law, (2)
the purpose of the new rule or remedy, (3) the reliance on the old
law, and (4) the effect on the administration of justice or on the
public at large, including the potential disruption of the statutory
or regulatory scheme (hereinafter referred to as "the public effect").94 The court could then pick the remedy which best accommodates the competing considerations. Certain alternate remedies
that presented unacceptable conflicts or sacrificed one factor for
another might be excluded at the outset.
In Stevens v. Califano,e6 a federal district court examined
both problems, but did not consider their interconnection. That
court invalidated Section 607 of the Social Security Act97 which
enlarged the AFDC program to include certain two-parent families
where the child "has been deprived of parental support or care by
reason of the unemployment . . . of his father."9 " The so-called

AFDC-U program thus reached families of unemployed fathers,
but not families of unemployed mothers. 9 The court held that the
statute violated the equal protection components of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.'"0
The court next considered the scope of its remedy-whether it
would extend the provision to two-parent families of unemployed
mothers, or enjoin payments to two-parent families of unemployed
fathers. In fashioning its remedy, the court chose extension over
curtailment because of a broad severability clause" 1 and the purpose of the AFDC-U program.102 The court found that the legisla94. The severability issue and the presumption of total retroactivity are subsumed
into this analysis, at least where they are not the type of "overriding consideration" which
negates the need for the type of analysis suggested here. See text accompanying notes 92-93
supra.
95. 448 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
96. Id. at 1323-24.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1980). See also text accompanying note 12 supra.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 607(a).
99. Id.
100. 448 F. Supp. at 1323. This case was affirmed per curiam on the basis of Califano
v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979). See text accompanying notes 11-15 supra.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1303 (1973). This clause states: "If any provision of this Act, or the
application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act,
and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected
thereby." Id.
102. 448 F. Supp. at 1323.
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ture intended "to provide benefits for needy children who are
needy because of the unemployment of their 'breadwinner.' ,,103
Next, the court considered the reliance, purpose and public effect
criteria, and denied all retrospective relief. The reliance, purpose
and public effect factors weighed against retroactive relief because
the case was one of first impression; some solvent families would
receive funds in derogation of the purposes of the statute; and the
increased financial burdens would not cure "[p]laintiffs' past
suffering." 104
Alternatively, the court could have determined that there were
no overriding criteria sufficient to dispose of these two problems,
and then used the analytic framework proposed here to reach the
same result. First the court would have formulated the following
six possible remedies:
Remedy 1: Extension of payments to two-parent families of
unemployed fathers or mothers; prospective application only.
Remedy 2: Extension of payments as above; retrospective application to the parties at bar only.
Remedy 3: Extension of payments as above; retrospective application to the parties at bar and to all parties similarly situated.
Remedy 4: Curtailment of payments to two-parent families of
unemployed fathers or mothers; prospective application only.
Remedy 5: Curtailment of payments as above; retrospective
application to the parties at bar only.
Remedy 6: Curtailment of payments as above; retrospective
application to the parties at bar and to all parties similarly
situated.
Next the court could have excluded those proposed remedies
which were unacceptable to it, applying the four interacting criteria to the remaining remedies. Remedies 5 and 6 would be immediately excluded as involving unjust and wholly impractical consequences. They would retroactively deprive two-parent families
with unemployed fathers of benefits already received. 10 5 Reimbursement by such families would have adverse impacts on the
public at large and the administration of justice.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1324.
105.

Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979).
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Remedies 2 and 3 would adversely affect the public by "placing an additional burden on an already financially troubled
[AFDC] program, [while failing to cure] the inequity suffered by
plaintiffs." 10 6 Indeed, Remedy 3 presents the same danger as that
10 7
posed by a retroactive application of Manhart,
namely, bankrupting the fund so that no one would receive any benefits.1 08
Remedy 4 would entirely defeat the purpose of the old law by discontinuing benefits to all two-parent families. The only remedy
that accommodates all four criteria is Remedy 1, the remedy selected by the court. This choice (1) accomplishes the purpose of
the old law by providing benefits to needy children in families
where the "breadwinner" is unemployed, 10 9 (2) accomplishes the
purpose of the new rule by focusing on need rather than gender,110
(3) avoids hardship due to reliance on the old law, 1 and (4) has
no adverse effect on the statutory scheme, the public at large, or
1 12
the administration of justice.
Conclusion
As courts become increasingly willing to invalidate laws on
equal protection grounds, they will have to re-formulate laws to
make them nondiscriminatory. It is not enough to find constitutional violations; courts must determine the effects of, and fashion
remedies for, the constitutional defects. This proposed analytical
framework can help achieve this result.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra!
448 F. Supp. at 1323.
Id.
Id. at 1324.
Id.

